title

'Bargaining over Governments in a Stochastic Environment'

author

'Antonio Merlo'

url

'http://www.jstor.org/stable/2138873'

abstract

'In this paper, I structurally estimate a stochastic bargaining model of government formation in a multiparty parliamentary democracy, and I conduct policy experiments to evaluate the effects of changes in the bargaining procedure. I show that the model fits well data on the duration of negotiations and government durations in postwar Italy. Also, I show that changes in the proposer selection process would not affect either the duration of negotiations or government durations, whereas the imposition of a strict deadline would in general reduce the incentives to delay agreement as well as government durations.'

journal

'Journal of Political Economy'

year

'1997'

Undefined

'00223808, 1537534X'

'1'

'101--131'

'University of Chicago Press'

'105'