title

'A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers'

author

'Daniel Diermeier and Michael Keane and Antonio Merlo'

url

'http://www.jstor.org/stable/4132683'

abstract

'Our main goal is to quantify the returns to a career in the United States Congress. We specify a dynamic model of career decisions of a member of Congress and estimate this model using a newly collected dataset. Given estimates of the structural model, we assess reelection probabilities, estimate the effect of congressional experience on private and public sector wages, and quantify the value of a congressional seat. Moreover, we assess how an increase in the congressional wage or the imposition of term limits would affect the career decisions of politicians and the returns from a career in Congress.'

journal

'The American Economic Review'

year

'2005'

Undefined

'00028282'

'1'

'347--373'

'American Economic Association'

'95'